Methods of Power for Development: Weapons of the Weak, Weapons of the Strong by Braithwaite, John
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 26 Issue 1 
2004 
Methods of Power for Development: Weapons of the Weak, 
Weapons of the Strong 
John Braithwaite 
Australian National University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the International Trade Law Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John Braithwaite, Methods of Power for Development: Weapons of the Weak, Weapons of the Strong, 26 
MICH. J. INT'L L. 297 (2004). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol26/iss1/10 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
METHODS OF POWER FOR DEVELOPMENT:
WEAPONS OF THE WEAK, WEAPONS
OF THE STRONG
John Braithwaite*
I. BEYOND REALISM: How DOES AMERICAN POWER WORK? . . ... 298
II. THE SEVEN ELEMENTS OF STATE EFFECTIVENESS
IN G LOBAL POLITICS ................................................................ 300
A. Concentrate Nodally the Power under Your
D irect C ontrol .................................................................... 300
B. Have a Big Stick and Threaten to Use it ........................... 302
C. Have a Responsive Regulatory Strategy ............................ 302
D . Networked Governance ..................................................... 305
E. Be Creative and Assertive at Nodes of
Networked Governance ..................................................... 307
F. Concentrate Technical Competence at Nodes ................... 310
G . Shift Forum s ...................................................................... 310
II1. CAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES MOBILIZE THESE
SEVEN DIMENSIONS OF POWER? ................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
A. Concentrate Nodally the Power under Your
D irect C ontrol .................................................................... 311
B. Have a Big Stick and Threaten to Use It ........................... 320
C. Have a Responsive Regulatory Strategy ............................ 322
D. Be Creative and Assertive at Nodes of Networked
G overnance ....................................................................... 325
E. Concentrate Technical Competence at Nodes ................... 326
F. Shift Forum s ...................................................................... 327
IV . C ONCLU SION ............................................................................ 329
Peter Drahos and I conducted a study during the 1990s on global
business regulation, interviewing more than five hundred key players in
approximately twenty globalizing business regulatory regimes. Results
from that study are used in this paper to inform the identification of
seven elements of American power in global governance. The paper then
poses the question whether those elements can be acquired by develop-
ing countries.
Regulatory theory is used to explain how American power works in
the world system. It works by networking corporate and state power with
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power in civil society. Particularly important in networked information
capitalism is the power that arises from concentrating expertise at crucial
nodes of governance. Mostly the United States has its way through dia-
logue led by experts who are analytically sophisticated and through the
deployment of a responsive regulatory pyramid. It is reluctant to fire the
big guns that underwrite its realist power.
George Monbiot provides an interesting approach for poor nations to
threaten their big stick of "owning" the rich nations' banks.' Peter Dra-
hos supplies insights into how developing countries can display a
responsive enforcement pyramid of networked governance. The power of
rich nations sometimes crumbles because their own largest corporations
and NGOs can be enrolled to defect to the cause of poor nations. This
allows in an era of networked governance, for weapons of the weak to
become formidable.
I. BEYOND REALISM: How DOES AMERICAN POWER WORK?
One of the empirical questions addressed by the Braithwaite and
Drahos study was: Who were the most influential shapers of global regu-
latory regimes?2 The remarkable empirical finding was that the single
most influential actor nominated across these regimes was the United
States! The second most economically powerful state of the 1990s (when
the interviews were conducted)-Japan-was reported to be much less
influential than the U.S. In not one of the regimes studied did any infor-
mant think Japan exerted more influence than the U.S., and in a minority
of regimes, the European Union was reported to be more influential than
the U.S., at least for some periods of the history of these regimes. More
often, however, the European Union was construed as a follower in the
wake of U.S. power rather than as a proactive shaper of regimes. Overall
the European Union was less likely to be regarded as influential and in
general was seen as less influential than the United States at the mo-
ments that mattered.
Realist international relations theorists tell us that the results from our
study predictably followed the pattern of outcomes expected. In other
words, from their perspective, all that tramping around the world to do the
empirical work was not necessary to reach such an expected result. Struc-
tural realists imagine the world as one billiard table where countries are
represented by the various colored balls. Under this metaphor, Japan is a
1. GEORGE MONBIOT, THE AGE OF CONSENT: A MANIFESTO FOR A NEW WORLD OR-
DER 174-80 (2003).
2. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000)
[hereinafter BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS].
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lot less influential than the United States because it is a much smaller
billiard ball and so lacks the momentum of the United States to knock
other states out of its path. And the European Union is much less power-
ful because it is not a Westphalian state. Rather than a billiard ball, it is a
sack of marbles. There is some truth in such realist metaphorical dispar-
agement of the anti-realist interpretations we drew from our data. Yet
structural realist international relations theory actually proffers a simplis-
tic account of the data, even of the particular examples above that offer
the core fit to its claims. Take the case of Japan. States like France and
the UK that had economies half its size in the 1990s, consistently across
regimes exerted much more influence than Japan in the shaping of
events. Often Nordic states, with less than a tenth of Japan's realist
power, exerted more influence in global regimes. Where Japan was in
important senses the dominant economic power, for example as the larg-
est exporter of motor vehicles throughout the 1990s and the owner of
much of the automotive manufacturing capability within the United States,
Germany, and other major exporting states, it was only a bit player in the
global regime for automotive standard setting.3 A number of informants
even thought Korea-admittedly a burgeoning economic power for most
of the 1990s, but bankrupt in 1998-was more effectively assertive than
Japan in this regime.
This essay posits and explicates the seven elements of global gov-
ernance revealed by our study that are necessary if states are to shape
global regimes:
1. Concentrate nodally the power under your direct control;
2. Have a big stick and threaten to use it;
3. Have a responsive regulatory strategy;
4. Network governance;
5. Be creative and assertive at nodes of networked governance;
6. Concentrate technical competence at nodes;
7. Shift forums when the forum gives the wrong result.
The United States is the pre-eminent economic power in the world
because it mobilizes influence across these seven elements more effec-
tively than Japan or the European Union, not just because it is the
biggest Westphalian billiard ball on the table. Being a big ball of power
certainly helps a great deal with some of these elements, especially the
first two. But the main game of power is fundamentally no longer
3. Id. at 438-51.
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Westphalian, as al Qaeda and Iraq have taught the United States, and as
Vietnam and the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan should have taught it
decades earlier. Manuel Castells, Rod Rhodes, Anne-Marie Slaughter
and others are closer to the mark when they argue that we are in an era
of networked governance.4 And Clifford Shearing and his co-authors
may be closer still when they argue that nodal governance deserves more
of our attention A node is a point in time and space where a cluster of
actors collaborate to mobilize pooled resources to tie together strands in
Castellian networks of power.
Stewart Clegg sees nodes as important in fixing "circuits of power"
in pre-modernity and earlier modernity as well as today. For example,
towns and trade fairs grew as nodes of private (corporate and guild) gov-
ernance that resisted feudal restrictions on commerce, production and
trade. Starting as minor nodes of power, towns "organizationally out-
flanked" the central locus of feudal power around the court. Later still,
tiny administrative nodes grew, in nineteenth century Prussia for exam-
ple, to become central state bureaucracies that organizationally
outflanked both cities and royal courts. It could be argued that even
transformations that in the end crush competing nodes of governance-
like Prussian bureaucracy-start out as modest nodes that mostly enroll
the power of others.
II. THE SEVEN ELEMENTS OF STATE EFFECTIVENESS
IN GLOBAL POLITICS
A. Concentrate Nodally the Power under Your Direct Control
Realist international relations theorists clearly have a point in attrib-
uting the less significant power of the EU to its not being a state. While
the combined military might of the EU is less than that of the United
States, its combined economic might is greater. This is important to note
because economic power is more important than military power in the
7
contemporary world for shaping global economic institutions, some in-
4. See MARK BEVIR & ROD RHODES, INTERPRETING BRITISH GOVERNANCE (2003); 1-
3 MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY. SOCIETY AND CULTURE (2000);
ROD RHODES, UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New
World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFE. 183 (1997).
5. See Clifford Shearing et al., Nodal Governance, Democracy and the New 'Deni-
zens': Challenging the Westphalian Ideal, 30 J.L. & Soc'Y 480 (2003); Scott Burris, Peter
Drahos & Clifford Shearing, Nodal Governance as an Approach to Regulation (2003) (unpub-
lished manuscript).
6. See STEWART CLEGG, FRAMEWORKS OF POWER 17, 248 (1989).
7. On the other hand, Braithwaite and Drahos found military coercion to be a more im-
portant mechanism of globalization than they had expected. It was much less important in the
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fluential analyses arguing too that military power is in any case mainly
based on economic power.8 The metaphor of the EU as a bag of marbles
rather than a realist billiard ball then has some merit. The EU has not
been able to consolidate its power at one center of gravity that enables it
to mobilize as much influence as the United States. This realist observa-
tion is right even though it is a contingent fact of an historical process
where, if the French have their way, European power will become more
militarily and economically consolidated in this century. It is indeed a
contingent fact that Napoleon was defeated in his consolidation project,
while the American Revolution and Civil War prevailed as federating
projects that consolidated the exercise of global power.
But bringing consolidated power to bear at a point of influence is
also a contingent fact of Westphalian state power. Japan is an example of
a state that has been unable to do it well in global forums. States that
boxed above their weight globally during the 1990s-like the Nordic
States and Australia-were States we would argue, that managed to con-
centrate their limited power pointedly at nodes of governance that tied
wider networks of power together. Drahos and I were unsure about the
roots of Japanese enfeeblement.9 Some part of this story jumps ahead to
the fourth element of power discussed below-assertiveness and creativ-
ity in nodal dialogue-where command of the imperial language helps
the Americans. But the most recurrently mentioned difference between
the United States and Japan by our informants, including the Japanese
ones, was that in global negotiating forums the Japanese State would
often find it impossible to settle in a timely fashion whether it would be
the finance (or trade and industry) or the environmental ministry who
would speak for Japan at a global forum on say environmental policy.
Both might attend the key negotiating forum and both would sit on their
hands for fear of causing loss of face to the other. Globally effective
Westphalian states, in contrast, have decisive procedures for making a
call on what the State's position will be and which bureaucracy will have
the job of executing it with maximum assertion in the forums that count
most. The United States is quite good at this, Sweden even better. But of
course even states that are good at preventing division from disabling
final decades of the twentieth century than it had been mid-century and in previous centuries.
Military coercion was found, nevertheless, to be fundamental as a mechanism of globalization,
being most important with the forms of regulation which have been constitutive of the very
possibility of global capitalism. Capitalist institutions of contract, property rights, finance,
trade, competition and labour policy were substantially globalized by imperial and colonial
conquest dating back to the Romans and even to earlier Greek and Persian empires.
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 2, at 532-35.
8. See, e.g., PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC
CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1987).
9. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 2.
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their power have moments of weakness, which is one reason why tiny
Vietnam was able to defeat mighty America in a protracted war and, as
we will see below, weak developing countries were able to defeat the
U.S. on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment in 1998.
B. Have a Big Stick and Threaten to Use it
The neo-conservatives of the current U.S. administration are ob-
sessed with the big stick dimension of U.S. power. They are right to see
the big stick as having awesome potential but wrong in their myopic
failure to see that overuse of such power enables your enemies to mobi-
lize the other six elements of global power more effectively against you.
Nevertheless, the fundamental realist insight is right that the United
States has a big stick, but countries such as Togo do not, and therefore it
follows that the United States can exercise power in a way Togo cannot.
The United States has not only the biggest military sticks, it also makes
best use of its economic sanction of denied access to the largest national
market. Drahos and I found that, while the United States used bilateral
trade sanctions to achieve its objectives more than any other state, it
much more often achieved results by less severe measures such as
watch-listing. As a pressure creating tool by which the United States
names a nation on its "list" for engaging in a practice that is viewed as a
threat to U.S. interests, watch-listing poses a heightened risk for the
named country because their outing might so enrage the United States
polity that it becomes feared the country will slide down a slippery slope
to retaliation unless the alleged threatening practice is stopped. There-
fore, for the United States it has often proven effective to use watch-
listing or the threat of it, followed by escalation to threatening trade
sanctions without actually using them, and even more commonly by dia-
logue without any semblance of threatening watch-listing let alone actual
sanctions. '0
C. Have a Responsive Regulatory Strategy
The reason the United States uses trade sanctions more than any
other State is that they are a more effective weapon for them than for
countries with smaller domestic markets. Even so, the reason that the
United States uses trade sanctions with extreme reluctance as a tool of
last resort is that U.S. policymakers have mostly had a sophisticated and
tacit understanding of responsive regulatory theory. The trade enforcement
pyramid described at the end of the last section and represented pictorially
in Figure 1 below is more effective than prompt deterrence with sanctions.
10. Id. at 535-39.
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Responsive regulatory theory advises actors who wish to be influential to
"speak softly while carrying a big stick." The greatest power comes from
being a "benign big gun" rather than a sheriff who shoots up the town
regularly. The United States' practice of effective power has not been pre-
emptive. Until the current administration, the United States eschewed its
own myths of the righteous sheriff with a quick draw who does not care
whether the bad guys are brought in dead or alive.
FIGURE I
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE'S ENFORCEMENT PYRAMID
gi e
han
Escalated
ade Sanction
Trade Sanctions
Direct Threat of
Sanction Imposition
Watch-Listing
Threatened Watch Listing
Horse Trading
Dialogue
I
/
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Under a responsive regulatory pyramid, one attempts first to get
things done by dialogue, by appeals to the fairness and mutual interests
that would be served by the desired outcomes from the regulatory game.
If that fails, there can be escalation to a mix of dialogic appeals to the
common sense of one's position, combined with offers of concessions to
the interests of the regulated actor-giving them some things they want
that are under your control in return for them giving in to the appeal of
your argument. The next option is to threaten watch-listing, followed by
actual watch-listing. Finally there is the actual imposition of trade sanc-
tions, then more trade sanctions when the initial sanctions prove
insufficient. If the policies of a regime become utterly intractable in the
view of the United States, regime change is an option. Regimes can be
changed either covertly, as with Guatemala in the 1950s, or Chile in the
1970s, or overtly as with Iraq in 2003.
The virtues of the pyramid are various. Because dialogue is cheaper
than sanctions or regime change, it is cost-effective to push the action
down as low in the pyramid as possible. Powerful actors who have no
reluctance about using unbridled coercion undermine their hegemony
because power seems more legitimate when it is secured through dia-
logue alone. Additionally, defiance is more dependable when power is
repeatedly exercised at the end of the barrel of a gun." When the only
sanctions available to the regulator are draconian, like regime change,
regulated actors are prone to think any threat to use them a bluff. On the
other hand, when a hierarchy of escalating sanctions is displayed by
regulators, they are more credible in communicating an image of invin-
cibility. The incrementalism of escalation seems more inexorable when a
pyramid is displayed. Regulated actors scan the hierarchy of escalations
in the pyramid, thinking that "we might be able to hold out against this,
but if they then escalate higher, we will have to give up our resistance so
we might as well give up now to minimize the costs of our resistance." A
number of other reasons why a responsive regulatory pyramid is more
effective than consistent deterrence have been outlined by Ian Ayres and
myself.'2 The claim here is that U.S. diplomats have a good tacit under-
standing of responsive regulatory theory and achieve more of their
objectives responsively than by raw exercises of punitive power.
11. See Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the
Criminal Sanction, 30, J. RES. CRIM. & DELINQ. 445 (1993).
12. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RE-
SPONSIVE REGULATION (2002).
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D. Networked Governance
Manuel Castell's three volume magnum opus on The Information
Age addresses the way economy, society, and governance have changed
to exploit the increasingly global networking of information.'3 Corpora-
tions, for example, have been transformed into networks. Top-down
design of strategy invites failure in the face of diverse market dynamics
in different parts of the globe. Information technology now allows the
decentralized retrieval of information about market dynamics from dif-
ferent points in space and time and the integration of this information
into flexible systems of strategy-making and flexible production sys-
tems. Small and medium businesses increasingly link across borders
with large corporations to form endlessly adapting networks. "Thus, the
actual operating unit becomes the business project, enacted by a net-
work, rather than individual companies or formal groupings of
companies' 4 Companies that fail to adapt to these new possibilities in
the networked economy cease to dominate global markets. So the infor-
mation age is not only one where a lot of States are hollowed out, but
also one where we find a lot of hollowed out corporations; "lean" busi-
nesses that specialize in intermediation between financing, production,
and sales on the back of an established brand.'5 Similarly States that fail
to adapt to the possibilities for networked governance fail to dominate
global governance. A State with an agenda of, for example, strengthen-
ing institutions of competition policy globally, will be more effective if it
uses information technology for the decentralized retrieval of perspec-
tives from diverse societies on what sort of competition policy they have
and what sort they want to have to cope with the different competition
dynamics in economies that are small versus large, 6 and at different
stages of the development of the differing varieties of capitalism. 7 In-
deed, in the literature on flexible production systems, the distinction
between private and public organizations becomes increasingly blurred,
so public sector organizations find it hard to resist the flexible produc-
tion imperatives of their private partners. For example, Michael Dorf and
Charles Sabel use the way the Pentagon creates competing collabora-
tions of private and public partners at different levels of a project (e.g.
weapon, targeting IT, delivery vehicle) so that in the end the best set of
13. CASTELLS, supra note 4.
14. CASTELLS, supra note 4, at 177.
15. Id. at 176.
16. See MICHAL GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES (2003).
17. See PETER. A. HALL & DAVID SOSKICE, VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITU-
TIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (2001).
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private-public collaborations for each segment of the project might be
integrated into the best whole-of-project integration.'8
Warfare is indeed one of many governance functions that became in-
creasingly networked in the late 20th century. If the enemy is better able
than you to integrate a diaspora of local factions and warlords onto their
side of the struggle, then you are likely to lose, as the Soviet Union
found in Afghanistan. As a good example of this, the United States suf-
fered limited losses in its 2001 Afghan war because it not only
networked a lot of States to fight on its side of the struggle, it also net-
worked many local warlords, local religious leaders and NGOs.
Networked governance links the capability of powerful bureaucracies
(like the U.S. Air-Force's smart bombs) to micro-organizational capabil-
ity (such as the capability of a local warlord to know who the local
Taliban are and kill them house to house). Information age governance
also networks corporate with State power as modern armies use private
sector contractors in the field for all manner of functions from servicing
vehicles to diagnosing intelligence. In the world of networked govern-
ance even the activity that Max Weber saw as definitional of the
Westphalian State-monopoly over the use of armed force-becomes
diffusely networked.' 9
Networked governance means a shift in both the private and public
sector from Fordist control of a systematically specialized, broken-down
production system to post-Fordist steering of more volatile systems that
are partially contracted-out and partly contracted-in to shifting collabora-
tive groups that compete for growth with outsiders and insiders.
According to Dorf and Sabel, this competition is part of the error-
detection system in which work groups watch for flaws in the work of
competing groups so they can show how their output can surpass the
benchmarks set by these competitors.20 Excellence is grounded in col-
laboration, detection of poor performance in competition. Everyone is
learning how to continuously improve by monitoring everyone else.
Monitoring and steering are therefore not only top-down. End-of-century
production methods institutionalize more participatory and complex
forms of self-regulation of production of public goods as well as private
ones.
On Castells' view, from the 1960s other nations such as Japan and
Sweden were the first movers, starting in their private sectors transcending
the Fordism of American economic leadership through a move to more
18. Michael C. Doff & Charles F Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimental-
ism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
19. See PETER W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILI-
TARY (2003).
20. See Doff & Sabel, supra note 18.
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flexible and participatory production systems (Toyotism). 2' But the United
States proved a faster learner than most societies, for example taking
flexible production ideas into its public sector provision of goods like
defense much more aggressively than the Japanese State whose own
private sector had taken so many of the original important leaps. Rapid
application by the United States of Japan's productions system is partly
attributable to superior institutions of learning in the United States, a
theme visited in the next section.
E. Be Creative and Assertive at Nodes of Networked Governance
At the time of his seminal writings, Frederick von Hayek may well
have been wrong that central planning could not work because States
would never have satisfactory local knowledge of what was needed.2 A
large Westphalian State, Hayek believed, lacks contextual wisdom in its
top-down planning, rendering it incapable of the synoptic wisdom to
understand how the economy works. He therefore prescribed spontane-
ous ordering through the price signals of the market as a better
institutional design than state planning. In conditions of Fordist produc-
tion, it is doubtful whether Hayek was right. In the capitalist world,
coordinated market economies seem to do better in certain market niches
than liberal market economies (and vice versa).23 As the World Bank's
East Asian Miracle report24 documented, the late industrializing states of
Asia flourished through a developmental state model, as Japan did after
the Meiji Restoration in the 19th century,5 that involved quite a heavy
hand of state planning. For this reason, the Soviet economy seemed to
grow faster than the West for most of its existence up to the 1970s.26
German national socialism also seemed a formidable production ma-
chine mid-century. The German and Russian war production capabilities
seemed so formidable during the heyday of industrial capitalism that had
they been turned against the Franco-Anglo-American capitalist axis, in-
stead of turned against each other on the Russian front, it would have
been the economies with the greater centralized planning capabilities
that would have prevailed against the more liberal economies.
According to Castells, the Soviet economy and the Soviet war ma-
chine finally fell behind the West not because it could not manage
21. CASTELLS, supra note 4, at 177.
22. FREDERICK A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
23. See HALL & SOSKICE, supra note 17.
24. WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POL-
ICY (1993).
25. See 3 CASTELLS, supra note 4, at 11, 212-33.
26. 3 CASTELLS, supra note 4, at 5-67.
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21industrialism but because it could not manage an information economy.
Just as according to Clegg's analysis late medieval towns were nodes
that pried open cracks in feudal circuits of power, internet companies
might similarly be conceived as nodes of private governance that have
the unintended effect of splitting open the industrial and military power
of the Soviet bloc .2 An information economy cannot be centrally
planned; it can only be centrally facilitated and coordinated. The ideas,
the networked connections, the new directions, must come from below.
Clifford Shearing and his co-authors Jennifer Wood, Scott Burris, and
Peter Drahos take off from this new contemporary relevance of the
Hayekian analysis of impoverished local knowledge under state plan-
ning, and instead of moving to an unregulated market prescription move
to a nodal governance prescription.2 ' A dense network of decentralized
governance is impossible for anyone to understand synoptically. We only
understand bits of the network that we can monitor directly. While gov-
ernance cannot encompass synoptic planning, actors can govern nodally.
They can see enough of what is going on to clarify that if they can get
other key actors who control different strands of a network of govern-
ance to collaborate at a particular node, those strands can be tied
together into a web of controls. Nodal partnership can grasp together a
set of strands of governance to produce effects that can be monitored
(albeit imperfectly) to reveal that the nodal governance has or has not
effected change. The shifts in this complex web of forces that mediate
change may not be well understood, for any understanding that was true
today may not be true tomorrow. Linking back to the Dorf and Sabel
literature on flexible production systems, nodal governance is "democ-
ratically experimental."30 It is about learning through monitoring after the
event, as opposed to understanding and planning synoptically before the
event.
It follows that to be influential in the emerging global information
society, nations must nurture entrepreneurs of nodal governance. Peter
Drahos has shown through systematic empirical enquiry how the Trade
Related Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement that emerged from the
Uruguay Round of world trade talks was the doing of a few Washington
legal entrepreneurs who established nodes of global intellectual property
governance such as the Industry Functional Advisory Committee on Intel-
lectual Property Rights for Trade Policy Matters with the assistance of
27. Id.
28. CLEGG, supra note 6, at 248.
29. Shearing et al., supra note 5.
30. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 18.
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some key U.S. CEOs.3' Formally powerless Washington entrepreneurs
operating out of tiny offices enrolled the power of some major multina-
tional corporations which in turn enrolled the power of the U.S. President,
the European Union, and ultimately the new World Trade Organization.1
2
The various nodes of governance that mattered in shaping TRIPS were
often ad hoc creations of the entrepreneurs of nodal governance.
Such spontaneous cooperation would be hard to imagine happening
in Japan. It is also harder to do in Europe where industry leaders are ex-
pected to wield their influence through channels that are more
hierarchically integrated through official industry associations.
33 The en-
trepreneurialism that enables this kind of nodal governance in the United
States may be partly a creation of the kind of education system that pre-
vails there. It is a system that nurtures assertiveness, in contrast to
Japanese learning patterns which counsel silence in the presence of peo-
ple who are hierarchically senior to oneself. The American university
system also nurtures a particular kind of creativity-creativity in institu-
tional design. The more basic point is that most of the best universities in
the world are in the United States. Most of the rest of the best universi-
ties are in Europe. In the humanities and social sciences, it is the
European university system that has produced the most paradigm-
shifting theoretical thinking, from the likes of Wittgenstein, Habermas,
and Foucault in the twentieth century. This is because the European uni-
versity system valorizes the deepest, most philosophically profound
thought. The American academy in contrast has been shaped by a more
pragmatist tradition, well exemplified by the work of Dorf and Sabel
discussed above.34 As a result, American universities produce most of the
influential theoretical thinking and the best training in concrete institu-
tional design. American law schools, for example, help to produce
lawyers who think more instrumentally about rules and their effective-
ness than their English common law or European civil law counterparts.
This American pragmatic intellectual creativity in institutional design
seems an underestimated reason for the disproportionate influence in
nodal design of American entrepreneurs of governance.
31. See PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM 61-120
(2002) [hereinafter DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM].
32. On enrollment, see Bruno Latour, The Powers of Association, in POWER, ACTION
AND BELIEF: A NEW SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE? 32 Soc. REV. MONOGRAPH 246 (John Law
ed., 1986).
33. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 2, at 488-94.
34. See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 18.
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F. Concentrate Technical Competence at Nodes
Another reason developing countries were utterly outmaneuvered
with TRIPS was that none of them had people with technical compe-
tence in intellectual property on their negotiating teams for the Uruguay
Round. 5 Again the United States' advantage here was partly a legacy of
its pragmatic education system. Most of the best intellectual property
lawyers in the world are Americans, even if most of the best work on the
philosophy of intellectual property is done outside the United States.
The first of our seven elements for influence in global politics was to
"Concentrate Nodally the Power under Your Direct Control." For the
same reasons adduced in that section, the current heading might better
read "Concentrate Nodally the Technical Competence Under Your Direct
Control." It is no use having wonderful intellectual property lawyers if
you do not organize them to turn up in Geneva to advise you when
something like TRIPS is being negotiated. Again, the United States is
extremely accomplished at understanding that in an information econ-
omy knowledge is power more so than ever. This is a point reinforced by
a finding of Drahos that the United States mobilizes technical expertise
to support its negotiating positions more effectively than most States,
particularly developing States.36
G. Shift Forums
Drahos and I reached the following conclusions about forum shifting
in the processes whereby business regulation has globalized:
When the post-World War II U.S. has not been able to get
multilateral agreement on what it wants, it either attempts to
shift decision-making to an alternative multilateral forum or
shifts to a sequence of bilateral deals with other key states.
These accumulated bilaterals often later set the framework for
a new attempt at multilateral agreement.
" There are three basic strategies of forum shifting around in-
ternational organizations:
(a) moving a regulatory agenda from one organization to an-
other;
(b) abandoning an organization; and
(c) pursuing the same agenda in more than one organization.
35. See DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM, supra note 31.
36. BRAITH WAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 2, at 134-37.
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" The first two strategies are only widely used by the United
States, and have only been practically available to the United
States, the EC, and (formerly) the USSR. Forum blocking,
preventing an international organization from acting as a fo-
rum for regulatory development in the first place, is an
additional fourth strategy used by major players.
* Strong states forum shift to fora that embed the principles most
valued by them for the regulatory problems at issue. For exam-
ple, the principle that knowledge is the "common heritage of
mankind" was defeated by shifting intellectual property issues
from UNESCO and UNCTAD to the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization and the GATT where knowledge was treated
as property subject to trade principles.37
Drahos and I are now not sure that our level of pessimism about fo-
rum shifting being unavailable as a weapon of the weak was justified.
Our mistake in Global Business Regulation was to ignore our own data on
how common it was for the fora that matter not to be formal or majori-
tarian, at least at first. TRIPS might have ended up an agreement in an
institution voted upon by the majority of the world's states, but we have
just seen that it grew from nodes of governance at which few states and
even a minority of American business were engaged.
In the final section of this essay we will return to the possibilities for
forum shifting by developing countries. For now, all we must note is that
the historical fact of the matter is that most of the forum shifting that re-
made the world in the last half of the twentieth century was American.
This is our final element of how American power works.
III. CAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES MOBILIZE THESE
SEVEN DIMENSIONS OF POWER?
A. Concentrate Nodally the Power under Your Direct Control
No developing country has much economic power under its control,
and only a few have the military power that follows from having weapons
of mass destruction. In other words, there is not much power to concen-
trate. Even so, it must be said that many developing countries have some
limited old-fashioned Westphalian State capacity. The World Bank and
other development agencies, under their "good governance" policies, stand
ready to assist developing countries develop state capacity. This is often a
37. Id. at 28-29.
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form of assistance that developing countries should grab with both hands
when it is offered.
This will not take them far, however, in confronting the very institu-
tions that disable them from acquiring the power required to resist their
impoverishment. Here is why the prescription to network governance has
been linked in this section to the prescription to have state capacity con-
centrate the power under its direct control. For developing countries, the
concentration prescription does not get them far when they have little to
concentrate, but the networking prescription might take them far now that
they live in a world of networked governance where a galaxy of points of
concentrated power can be enrolled into a network. The first possibility is
to enroll into a network the power of other developing countries that share
structurally similar interests on particular issues.
Drahos and I,38 like others,39 concluded that Australia, a State with
comparatively little economic or military power under its direct control,
had a significant influence on the Uruguay Round of world trade talks by
initiating the Cairns Group of agricultural exporting nations. This group
had limited success in getting agriculture into the Uruguay Round and in
securing modest concessions on access to European, U.S., and Japanese
agricultural markets.
Consequently, Peter Drahos began to advocate the pursuit of an elabo-
rated version of the Cairns group by developing countries. His other model
was the Quad, a group composed of the United States, Canada, the Euro-
pean Union, and Japan; which the United States led so effectively during
the Uruguay Round. Basically, the United States would develop a trade
policy its closest trading partner--Canada--could live with, and then open
the real negotiations with the European Commission (EC). Once the
United States and the EC agreed to push a common position, Japan would
usually fall into line with it. In that way, the position of the Quad would
prevail. This inspired Drahos to advocate a developing country Quad, in
which leading developing economies with large markets, notably China,
India, and Brazil, would lead a trade policy to reduce poverty around
which most developing countries might rally. At the very least this would
make the developing countries a group the Quad would have to negotiate
with in future trade rounds, as the Quad was forced to do with the Cairns
Group during the Uruguay Round. Drahos's idea was to avert the situation
that had occurred with TRIPS, where all the key deals were done in Ge-
neva without any developing country representative being in the room. It
was also to be more creative and aggressive than the 1986 group of ten
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Richard A. Higgott & Andrew F. Cooper, Middle Power Leadership and
Coalition Building: Australia, the Cairns Group, and the Uruguayan Round of Trade Negotia-
tions, 44 INT'L ORG. 589 (1990).
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developing countries that had attempted unsuccessfully to block the U.S.
proposals for new themes for the GATT that included intellectual property,
services, and investment. Fundamentally, what Drahos now calls "A De-
mocratic G Group" should learn lessons from both the Cairns Group and
the Quad to realize the seven identified elements that have been the key to
U.S. power.40 For the moment in this section, we are addressing just two of
these.
The United States manages to concentrate its power in trade negotia-
tions by moving backwards and forwards between its multilateral agenda
and, when that is momentarily thwarted, its bilateral negotiations, which
include the individual picking off of politically and economically signifi-
cant States. These bilaterals progressively lock more States into the
preferred U.S. multilateral outcome until the point is reached where the
United States can attempt to nail that multilateral agenda again. It is a co-
ordinated strategy. Developing countries need a similarly coordinated
response, and networking is the only option for developing countries to
concentrate their collective power into coordinated resistance to U.S. bi-
laterals and multilateral agendas.
Drahos's Democratic G Group is a proposed node to tie such con-
centrated power of the poor together. He calls it democratic because its
constitution should provide a model of what the entire WTO could be-a
forum where leadership is genuinely rotated and where every member's
vote counts. After two years of advocating this in various public fora,
Drahos was of course delighted to see the leadership of Brazil with
China, India, and South Africa at the Cancun Ministerial Conference in
making the G-20 a force in the WTO. It was a step in the direction he
had been advocating. Indeed, it accomplished the hardest part of such a
networking project-getting the massive developing markets of China
and India to work together, something that had in the past proved diplo-
matically tricky, notwithstanding the structural similarities of the
interests of these two mega-states. But the G-20 has a long way to go to
meet Drahos's vision for the Democratic G Group. Like the Cairns
Group, the G-20 has been so far single-issue in its orientation-blocking
the Doha Round of world trade talks until it includes meaningful pro-
posals for improved developing country access to Northern agricultural
markets. Unlike the Cairns Group, the G-20 is not highly organized with
a Secretariat to form the node that networks high quality analytical work.
Also working against the G-20 is evidence that the United States, con-
cerned about the G-20, is offering members inducements to defect from
40. See Peter Drahos, Towards a Democratic G-Group in the WTO (2004) (unpublished
manuscript)[hereinafter Drahos, Towards a Democratic G-Group].
Fall 20041
Michigan Journal of International Law
it.41 This will work for the United States if members see the G-20 as no
more than a blocking coalition that will inevitably remove the blockage
once some concessions have been made by the United States and Europe.
To hold the network fast against U.S. bribes to defect from it, the G-20
must have a visionary agenda for a better world system that can be ap-
41. Below is a table prepared by Peter Drahos on "Dividing and Conquering-the use
of forum-shifting in trade to break up developing country groups." The countries in italics
represent the key leaders of the G-20. The table shows that being an ex-G-20 state or a non-G-
20 state assists with being offered a Free Trade Agreement with the US. Id.
G20 Ex --G20 CAIRNS GROUP FTA WITH US?
Argentina Y Y
Australia Y Y
Bolivia Y Y Proposed
Brazil Y Y
Canada Y Y (NAFTA)
Chile Y Y Y
China Y
Colombia Y Y Proposed
Costa Rica Y Y Y (CAFTA)
Cuba Y
Ecuador Y Proposed
Egypt Y
El Salvador Y Y (CAFTA)
Guatemala Y VY (CAFTA)
Honduras Y (CAFTA)
India Y
Indonesia Y Y
Malaysia Y Proposed
Mexico YY (NAFTA)
New Zealand V
Nicaragua V Y(CAFTA)
Nigeria Y
Paraguay Y V
Pakistan Y
Peru V Proposed
Philippines Y y
South Africa Y Y Y (SACU)
Being neg.
Tanzania Y
Thailand Y Y Proposed
Uruguay Y
Venezuela Y
Zimbabwe Y
19 7 17
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proached by feasible incremental steps. That vision is also needed to di-
vide the United States and Europe politically in their resolve to crush the
group. The key to accomplishing that rests with the ability of the G-20 to
create an inspiring vision for U.S. and European NGOs to work with it
against their own states.
Northern NGOs are crucial to understanding the possibilities for a
more just world. The Third World prior to 1989 could pull off some vic-
tories against the First World when they could get the backing of the
Second World (the Soviet bloc). They also did better at attracting foreign
aid prior to 1989 because they could play the First World off against the
Second. A conventional reading of these facts is that they are simply a
story of schism based on the geo-politics of the cold war. While this is a
big part of the story, it is also a tale about States that were agents of mul-
tinational corporations and States that were not. We have seen how
TRIPS was about the CEOs of a number of U.S. multinationals enrolling
progressively more States to their agenda of a new world intellectual
property order.
The division between First World States that were happy to be
agents of their multinationals and Second and Third World States that
were not fell with the Berlin Wall for the following reasons. Many of the
new rulers of the old communist States (somewhat naively) believed at
first that multinational corporations would move in on a wide front, that
their indigenous entrepreneurial talents would soon give birth to their
own international businesses, and they would quickly become a business
culture. The First World could now count on the Second World to vote
with them on challenges to a liberal international economic order, to vote
in favor of deregulation and against international regulation of business.
In the two-level game of international politics, 2 developing country lead-
ers looked across the table to the row of newly neoliberal faces and
decided they now had to turn around to convince their domestic constitu-
encies that they should be one of the early mover developing states who
jump to neoliberalism. It was a move based on weakness, based on their
inability to imagine ever putting together a veto coalition against George
H.W. Bush's New World Order.
That incapacity for developing State imagination ended with the
collapse of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in 1998.
Once TRIPS had been won in 1995, liberalizing investment was the
new number one priority of the U.S.-Europe business axis. One MAI
negotiator boasted that "we are writing the constitution of a single
42. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988).
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global economy.' 43 How did developing countries find the courage to
speak out against the MAI instead of allowing themselves to be led like
lambs to the slaughter as they had done with TRIPS (which also struc-
turally disadvantaged them as net importers of intellectual property
rights)? One answer is that they found a new ally with whom they
could forge a veto coalition. This was the Northern NGOs that opposed
the MAI-the environmental, consumer, women's, labor, and other
citizen groups that rejected it. In the MAI campaign, these groups har-
nessed the technology of the internet for global campaigning at an
unprecedented level. Just as a veto coalition of the Third and Second
Worlds could block global corporate agendas during the heyday of
UNCTAD and the New International Economic Order in the 1970s,
developing countries learned through the MAI that a veto coalition of
developing countries and international NGOs could work. They applied
this new confidence to blocking the Millennium Round of the World
Trade Organization in Seattle a year later (1999) and (for the moment)
the Doha Round through the agency of the G-20 in 2003.
In retrospect it would have seemed crazy to developing countries
that puny NGOs could be as useful an ally as the mighty Soviet block.
But we can also see that, in the two-level game of international politics,
n
while NGOs contribute much less at the international table than the So-
viets did, they contribute much more at domestic tables. There are, for
instance, more internet campaigners who vote in U.S. Presidential elec-
tions than communists, and unions have been serious campaign
contributors to the likes of Bill Clinton, Al Gore, and John Kerry.
Developing nations and Northern NGOs had very different interests
on matters such as the MAI. So did developing countries and the Soviet
bloc. You don't have to agree with your allies in a veto coalition on what
you want. You only have to agree on what you want to block. There is an
interesting symmetry between the Third World/NGO campaign to block
the MAI and the Third/Second World campaign of the 1970s for a Code
of Conduct for Transnational Corporations in the aftermath of the Lock-
heed bribery scandal and the involvement of ITT in the coup that
installed General Pinochet to the Presidency of Chile. The United States
and Europe finally killed the Code of Conduct on Transnational Corpo-
rations in 1995 because it imposed a large set of ethical obligations on
multinational corporations without giving them sufficient rights to invest
wherever they wanted. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, which
43. Renato Ruggiero, Remarks at the time of the 1996 ministerial meeting at the World
Trade Organization (VTO) (Dec. 9-13, 1996). See Press Release, UNCTAD, UNCTAD &
WTO: A Common Goal in a Global Economy, TAD/INF/PR/9628 (Aug. 10,1996).
44. See Putnam, supra note 42.
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NGOs and developing countries killed, did just the opposite. It gave cor-
porations a lot of new rights to free movement of investment (and
protection from expropriation) without imposing obligations on investors
to protect the environment, to honor consumer protection standards, to
guarantee equal employment opportunities for women and other core
labor standards, to respect human rights and to assist the development of
the countries in which they invest through transfer of technology to lo-
cals.
After the failure of an agreement that imposed lots of obligations on
multinationals and gave them few rights to a more liberal investment
regime, and then the failure of another agreement that offered them lots
of rights and no obligations, after win-lose and lose-win for the develop-
ing countries and multinationals respectively, perhaps it is time for win-
win? In other words, maybe its time for an agreement that imposes heav-
ier development, human rights, and environmental obligations on
multinational corporations in return for a more liberal global investment
regime. At least it seems clear at the moment that in this contest of prin-
ciples, either neither side will prevail in entrenching their principles into
international law or both sides will have to allow in some of the princi-
ples of the other.
Another way of looking at the implausible accomplishment of the
defeat of the MAI is that while States were very divided in their support
for it, NGOs (North and South) were reasonably unified in their opposi-
tion. In Robert Putnam's empirical analysis of the Bonn economic
summit of 1978, he exposed a critical theoretical weakness of privileging
unified Sates as actors.4 ' This summit secured agreement on crucial ele-
ments of the Tokyo Round of the GATT (substantial tariff reductions and
a subsidies and countervailing duties code), particularly from a reluctant
France. The summit also achieved pump-priming commitments by the
trade surplus States of Germany and Japan and oil price deregulation by
the United States. According to the Putnam analysis, the summit accord
was only possible because all key States were internally divided. Influen-
tial minority factions within the economic policy communities of the key
States forged a winning global coalition of minority factions. A coalition
of President Carter's international and economic advisors favored oil price
decontrol, but this was opposed by the President's domestic policy advi-
sors and a strong majority in Congress. German pump priming was
favored only by a small minority of officials in the Economics Ministry
45. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM & NICOLAS BAYNE, HANGING TOGETHER: COOPERATION
AND CONFLICT IN THE SEVEN POWER SUMMITS (1987); Putnam, supra note 42; Robert D.
Putnam & Randall Henning, The Bonn Summit of 1978: A Case Study in Coordination, in
CAN NATIONS AGREE? ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION (Richard N. Coo-
per et a]. eds., 1989).
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and the Chancellery, leaders of labor unions, and the left wing of the So-
cial Democrats, but opposed by the Free Democrats, the Bundesbank,
most of the business and banking community, and most economic offi-
cials in the government. Expansionism by Japan was supported by a
coalition of business interests and LDP politicians of modest power, but
implacably opposed by the Ministry of Finance, the most powerful actor
in Japanese government. In each key State, "advocates of the interna-
tionally desired policy acted (in the words of one of the Americans) as a
kind of benevolent 'conspiracy', and in each case they signaled to their
foreign counterparts that additional international pressure would be wel-
come.' 46 Other empirical research suggests that at least half the time
during international crises, top national decision makers are not unified. 7
Internationally, NGOs often, though far from uniformly, have the ad-
vantage over the stronger corporate and State players in the world system
of a more unified position on the principles at issue. Take the example of
the peace movement which believes in peace everywhere and is always
opposed to war crimes. Whether States believe in peace or war, and
whether they will stand up against war crimes, depends on who is on the
other side. Hence it becomes possible for NGOs with a unified pro-peace
value position to join with peace loving States to institute an Interna-
tional Criminal Court against the opposition of states as powerful as the
United States and China.
While geopolitical strategic schisms can be pried open by weak
players like NGOs to divide and conquer strong States, it is hard for
them to pull this off without a seat at the international table. Conse-
quently, strategic trade schisms are what they exploit to divide and
conquer corporate power. This they can do more readily, and when they
do, the corporate schism becomes a rift among the state clients of corpo-
rate power. In the 1970s green groups in the United States successfully
lobbied for amendments to the Clean Air Act regarding ozone-depleting
substances. The United States and Sweden were the only countries that
banned Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in the 1970s. The U.S. environ-
mental movement succeeded on this in 1977 while the European groups
failed because U.S. industry opposition was simply less fierce. Why?
The dominant U.S. manufacturer of CFCs, DuPont, also had global lead-
ership in developing CFC substitute technology. DuPont rightly
wondered if European competitors would be forced to buy the DuPont
technology if they rolled over on the ozone campaign. Once the U.S.
environmental groups had won the ozone campaign, it clearly became
46. Putnam & Henning supra note 45, at 107.
47. See, e.g., GLENN H. SNYDER & PAUL DIESING, CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS: BAR-
GAINING, DECISION MAKING AND SYSTEM STRUCTURE IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES (1977).
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the case that U.S. business, and therefore Ronald Reagan, was now on
the side of the greens. They had a strategic trade interest in forcing
European and Japanese business to move up to the standards they had
already been forced to meet (and in doing so buy the U.S. CFC-
substitute technology). We are all familiar with this history. The Mont-
real Protocol was signed in 1987 and still stands as the most effective
global environmental agreement ever signed, making a real difference to
the closing of the ozone hole.
The lesson is that it is possible for NGOs to use strategic trade think-
ing to divide and conquer business and therefore States. Unabashed
green activists could enroll Ronald Reagan as their political agent. While
unified global business will almost always defeat a unified green move-
ment, an alliance of a unified green movement with American business
can defeat European business. Similarly, but in a different direction, an
alliance of united NGOs and European business can defeat American
business. The Global Business Regulation study gives examples of both
these scenarios."
Structural realist international relations theory is misleading because
packed inside its state billiard balls are often even bigger balls than the
State itself in the form of multinational corporations. Major States are
more like loosely cemented conglomerate rocks than billiard balls. When
some of their biggest conglomerates break off, mighty states can crum-
ble into impotence on an issue. Conversely, its breakaway fractions can
coalesce with minority factions from other States to form winning global
coalitions. This is why Putnam's two-table metaphor is more useful:
turning each billiard ball into a table of domestic politics across which
debate ranges, with all those domestic voices also sounding out allies
from other national tables to join hands with them at international nego-
tiating tables.49
The MAI campaign is a lesson in the strength of weak ties" in the
internet age. The new NGO networks which are the model mongers51 of
the information age do not operate on the principle of "solidarity for-
ever." They craft fluid, loosely coupled coalitions that coalesce around a
specific campaign like the MAI. If they are clever in the future, they will
see more and more opportunities to divide business and thereby create
divisions within and between States.
Drahos's idea of the Democratic G Group is that Northern NGOs
will be given something more formidable to couple with on specific
48. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 2.
49. See Putnam, supra note 42.
50. See Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM J. Soc., 1360-80
(1973).
51. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 2, at 578-601.
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networking issues as they come up. 2 If the Democratic G Group were
also more genuinely democratic than a Quad-dominated WTO, and em-
bodied a vision for tackling world poverty in the long run, NGOs would
also be more politically attracted to networking with it.
B. Have a Big Stick and Threaten to Use It
While it's all very well that effective networking by weak players
has induced the United States and Europe to negotiate seriously with
them, and created a divide and conquer wedge between the big players,
ultimate threats, what States can ultimately do if push comes to shove,
are important to the constitution of power. Ultimately, the United States
not only has the unmatched military power to effect regime change, but
also has access to a domestic market which is more important than ac-
cess to all developing markets combined. Finally, U.S. and European
multinationals have the power to withdraw investment from developing
countries, while there simply are no developing countries that can mount
a comparable credible threat of capital flight from the U.S. or Europe.
Enter George Monbiot's Manifesto for a New World Order.3 Monbiot
presents some interesting Keynesian ideas for establishing an International
Clearing Union to replace the IMF and for reforming the WTO into a Fair
Trade Organization. This paper neither considers these nor other ideas for
improving the deal that developing countries get from the world system.
This contribution is not about the substance of what are the best reforms
for the developing world but about the methods of power developing
countries might use to secure an agenda that they develop more democ-
ratically. From this perspective, the important contribution of Monbiot's
book is his idea of poor nations using debt as a weapon. It is based on
the old insight that if you owe the bank a thousand dollars, you are in
trouble; if you owe it a million dollars, the bank is in trouble. Monbiot
points out that the debt crisis of developing countries reached the point
in the late twentieth century where the poor world owns the rich world's
banks.
It would be misleading to make a direct comparison between the
size of the poor world's debt-some $2.5 trillion-and the size
of the combined reserves of all the world's central banks: some
$1.3 trillion. Much of the debt has already been "discounted": its
real value to the banks which issued it, or to the "secondary
debt" traders who have bought it, is less than its paper value. As
most of the debt is not one between governments, but rather a
52. Drahos, Towards a Democratic G-Group, supra note 40.
53. MONBIOT, supra note 1.
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debt between governments and the commercial banks and the
IMF and the World Bank, several intermediaries and complicat-
ing factors inhibit the translation of the banks' liabilities into
national stocks of gold and dollars. Even so, the figures provide
us with a rough idea of both the size of the weapon, and the in-
capacity of any government or financial institution to resist it,
which has been handed to the poor by the rapacity of the rich 4
Monbiot points out that there is a history of rich countries punishing debt
defaulters. But there is no point in developing countries collectively re-
sponding to this simply with a coordinated default of all dumping their
debts simultaneously. This is tantamount to the developing countries
throwing away their big gun before it had fired a shot. Instead, Monbiot
commends the IMF/World Bank model of attaching conditions to the
handling of debt:
Just as the IMF has threatened to ruin the economies of the poor
nations if they do not implement the reforms it demands, the
poor world should threaten to ruin the economies of the rich na-
tions if they do not agree to its terms. The point of possessing a
terrifying weapon is that you do not have to use it; the fear of the
weapon is sufficient to ensure that other people do as you de-
mand.5
This is another divide and conquer threat. Monbiot believes that the threat
of developing countries inducing a panic that no financial market could
resist would cause the enemies of the poor to turn upon each other. The
States that are clients of the most financially exposed banks would be the
first to come under pressure from its finance sector to be responsive to the
demands of the developing countries. As with the establishment of the G-
20, the idea is that several desperate developing States who have little to
lose politically would announce an intention to collectively boycott debt
repayment to a named date. They would have little to lose because the for-
bearance of their people has been stretched beyond its political limits.
Simultaneously mobilizing support for the boycott from international
NGOs, the small group of defaulters would urge other debtor nations to
join them by announcing the same intent unless their demands for a more
just international trading system were met. Monbiot believes that so long
as there was a critical mass of initial defiant States, the threat of default
could become contagious as nations found safety in numbers.
It would be uncertain, however, whether developing countries could
hold together this collective action challenge. But it is also uncertain
54. Id. at 174-75.
55. Id. at 175-76.
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how effective rich States could be in offering bribes to States to defect
from the boycott. The challenge on both sides would be considerable. On
the side of the rich States, they of course could not afford to pay a bribe
equal to the national debt of nation after nation. As they paid off one
State to defect from the boycott they would create a moral hazard prob-
lem. That is, the bribe to defect would cause other states to join the
boycott so they could be paid a bribe to defect from it. The challenge for
the boycotting poor nations would not be to convince rich nations that
they were certain to pull the boycott off. It would be to convince rich
nations that there was sufficient prospect of the boycott working for the
costs of bribing poor nations to defect, or not to join, to be unbearable
for the rich. Part of the strategy for making it more probable that the
poor countries could manage this gigantic collective action challenge
would be to demonstrate that they can manage more modest challenges
lower down an enforcement pyramid.
C. Have a Responsive Regulatory Strategy
One option for a graduated approach to a debt boycott would be to
first target banks domiciled in nations with vulnerable financial systems
and with domestic NGOs who would be particularly active in their
support for the Democratic G Group's demands.56 Once the most
susceptible and sympathetic target nation prevented the debt boycotting
of its banks by signing on to the proposals of the Democratic G group,
the second most susceptible and sympathetic nation would be more
likely to follow when it became the second target, and so on with the
third and fourth targets until a hold-out rich nation was encountered. The
idea would be, however, that before this graduated escalation got too far
the rich nations would see that the poor nations meant business and
therefore would see the incentive to sit down with them to renegotiate
the world trade and financial order.
It would be premature at this point to design an actual enforcement
pyramid. But some preliminary remarks toward such a design are in or-
der. Obviously, there would be no point in displaying an intention to
"watch-list" the United States as an importer (as in the U.S.'s own pyra-
mid of Figure 1). But given the importance of TRIPS to the U.S. and
Europe in the information age, an escalation in the collective defection
from more and more of the U.S.'s intellectual property agenda could be
plausible starting with an unbridled compulsory licensing of life-saving
drugs, followed by a possible suspension in the recognition of foreign
patents, and then collective resignation from the WTO. Moreover, given
56. Such as root and branch reform of the IMF and WTO.
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that developing countries have weaker trade and investment threats at
their disposal than rich nations, it would be important to consider non-
trade sanctions and rewards that touch the soft spots of rich nations in
the politics of escalation and de-escalation. For example, Europe is wor-
ried about illegal immigration from Africa. There are, presumably, a set
of things Africa could do to stem this flow at the source, and other things
it could refrain from doing that would make things much worse for
Europe. Terrorism prevention, intelligence, and financing is another ma-
jor soft spot for the North Atlantic powers, where greater and lesser
cooperation from developing countries is of enormous geo-political sig-
nificance. Commitments of major industrializing economies such as
China, Indonesia, India, and Brazil to global warming countermeasures
are of growing importance to rich nations. It would be possible to draw
up a very long list of obligations that rich countries want poor countries
to sign on to, from tax havens and money laundering to trading in nu-
clear materials. Sets of these could be organized as layers of a
progressively more politically unpalatable pyramid, with commitment to
undertake all obligations at the first layer suspended first, followed by
another pre-announced set of commitments that would be suspended
when the first set of suspensions produced no response, and so on. At the
peak of the pyramid of politically unpalatable measures for the rich
countries could be the most politically unpalatable measure of all,
George Monbiot's coordinated debt default. By signaling the political
will to escalate through the entire pyramid if needed to bring the rich
nations to their negotiating table, and then by actually beginning to esca-
late through the less politically unpalatable options at the bottom of the
pyramid, the poor countries could pressure rich nations to succumb to
the Democratic G group agenda. All rich nations would begin to doubt
the analysis that poor nations lack the collective action capability to
move up the pyramid. This would cause political division in all rich na-
tions fuelled by NGOs sympathetic to the poor countries' anti-poverty
agenda.
Peter Drahos has developed a networked governance approach to py-
ramidal escalation." The key idea is that instead of simply escalating to
tougher and tougher sanctions as a State or group of States rises up a
pyramid, wider webs of networked opposition are triggered by the esca-
lation. That is, escalation means enrolling more actors to put pluralized
forms of pressure on the regulated actor. A simple example is Drahos's
57. See Peter Drahos, Towards an International Framework for the Protection of Tradi-
tional Group Knowledge and Practice (2004), at http://ro.unctad.org/trade_env/testl/
meetings/tk2/drahos/draft.doc (draft paper prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat). See
also John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies, in GLOBAL COM-
PANIES, GLOBAL REGULATION (Ngaire Woods ed., forthcoming 2005).
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international enforcement pyramid for Traditional Group Knowledge and
Practice. 8 This pyramid might be mobilized, for example, by a cluster
like the twelve countries that in 2002 formed in Cancun the Group of
Like-Minded Countries. That group was of the same mind on the protec-
tion of traditional knowledge like indigenous crafts and medicines and
the illegal acquisition of genetic resources without compensation by
Northern multinationals. A node of governance that such a group of
States might institute would be a Global Bio-Collecting Society that
would track patents in Traditional Group Knowledge and Practice. In
Drahos's pyramid at Figure 2, the Global Bio-Collecting Society is a
nodal coordinator of many other actors at the peak of the pyramid. The
Global Bio-Collecting Society might sometimes take its own enforce-
ment action such as opposing a patent where an indigenous group is
unable to do so. But on other occasions it would provide information to
patent offices, indigenous groups or NGOs that might then take their
own action. Technically helpful analyses of patents might enable knowl-
edge-poor States and NGOs to widen webs of networked opposition by
communicating the implications of those analyses to wider communities
of concern.
58. Drahos, supra note 57, at 39-42.
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FIGURE 2
INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT PYRAMID FOR TRADITIONAL
GROUP KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE.59
Civil Society States
Indigenous Groups
Business,/ GBS
S Incapacitation
~~e.g., loss of patent
J Deterrence
/ e.g., legal action, publicity N
Persuasion - Dialogue
e.g., protocols and guidelines
D. Be Creative and Assertive at Nodes
of Networked Governance
Obviously crafting any enforcement pyramid of the sort described in
the previous section would require enormous creativity and assertiveness
to then display it to the rich countries. Second track diplomacy is one
path toward such creativity and assertiveness. Retired diplomats and
NGOs with nothing to lose can participate in second track diplomacy
both to define a set of demands for reforming institutions such as the
IMF and WTO and to devise options for an enforcement pyramid to
bring rich nations to the table for serious negotiations around those de-
mands. When today's diplomats see their retired mentors settle upon
some radical proposals for a new world order, this can give them confi-
dence to be creative and assertive in first track diplomacy. Engagement
of NGOs in second track processes to foment reform ideas might also
increase NGO buy-in for when the real North-South struggle begins.
NGOs like trade unions could also foster confidence-building in such a
difficult political enterprise by reflecting on their own history of strug-
gle-on how impossible it would have seemed to the workers of the 19th
century that by the early decades of the 20th century workers would have
59. Id. at 41.
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solved their collective action problems to stand united against employers
in national unions. Most importantly, NGOs could make a deliberative
contribution to the needed creativity and assertiveness for crafting nodes
of responsive networked governance.
E. Concentrate Technical Competence at Nodes
The United States and Europe might have the best universities in the
world, but Northern States cannot count on the loyalty of their universi-
ties in a struggle between the rich and the poor. My argument is that any
credible strategy to transform global economic institutions will involve
Northern as well as Southern NGOs collaborating with developing na-
tions on reform agendas. What is needed is a set of nodes of governance
at which the best technical competence to be found among all those citi-
zens of the globe who believe in a world with less poverty can be
concentrated. Northern charitable foundations need to be persuaded to
fund such a convening of the most acute analytical capabilities.
In Peter Drahos's discussion of the Democratic G Group, he also
suggests pooling and sharing analytic resources among poor countries:
India, for example, could take the lead on investment and com-
petition, Brazil on agriculture and services, South Africa on
intellectual property and special and differential treatment and
so on. Other developing countries would join those working
committees in which they had interests and expertise, perhaps
forming sub-committees on particular issues (e.g. Kenya could
form a sub-committee on trade in genetic resources). 6°
For a poor country suffering negotiating fatigue in Geneva from the de-
mands on its limited technical resources, putting its trust in monitoring
Kenya as its agent on genetic resources is not a perfect solution. It is,
however, a better solution than what poor countries presently do, which
entails ignoring the issue or putting their trust in the United States and
the EU. Drahos's conception of the Democratic G Group is that recom-
mendations would be formulated in a deliberatively democratic fashion.
Member states would not be obliged to reach a consensus position, and
neither would NGOs who might be attracted into the technical delibera-
tion. Working committees would simply develop a technical analysis of a
given issue and ensure that the discussion of the analysis followed a de-
liberative procedure. The analysis might or might not lead to a cluster of
60. Drahos, Towards a Democratic G-Group supra note 40; see also Peter Drahos,
When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the World Trade Organization, 8
INT'L NEGOTIATION 79-109 (2003).
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States and NGOs developing negotiating solidarity around that analysis
and crafting an enforcement pyramid to help realize its prescriptions.
F. Shift Forums
In the discussion on the responsive regulatory pyramid, one of the
more extreme options toward the tip of the pyramid was a collective de-
veloping country pull-out from the WTO. In Monbiot's proposal for a
Keynesian International Clearing Union as an alternative to the IMF, he
suggests that poor nations do not need to wait for rich countries to estab-
lish it: "They can found it themselves, fix the value of their currencies
against the bancor (or whatever they might call it), then invite the rich
countries, at the point of their financial gain, to join."'"
In a world of networked governance, as opposed to government by a
hierarchy of sovereigns, where the key sites of governance are more of-
ten nodes of informal governance of the networked collaboration, there
is more flux in the forums that matter. In Clifford Shearing's vision of
nodal governance of security in South African townships, if a commu-
nity peacemaking committee falls under the control of some tyrannous
faction, dissatisfied members of the community are counseled simply to
62
abandon it and to start a new peace committee. It is a lot easier than
starting a new police force or a new court system. Nodes of governance
attract support from citizens in this case as an alternative to South Afri-
can state structures of governance if people find the peacemaking
committee solves their security problems in dangerous communities
where personal safety is a big issue.
Let us return to the assertiveness of the Washington legal entrepre-
neurs who started the process of shifting domination of the global
intellectual property standards setting agenda from the World Intellectual
Property Organization. They did it simply by enrolling someone else's
power (the ad hoc power of strategically selected U.S. CEOs) to set up a
completely new node of governance. The Cairns Group was a com-
pletely new node of governance created by a set of non-core players of a
world trade game. Drahos's Democratic G Group was likewise not an
agenda for reforming the G-77, 63 but a proposal for a new nodal focus for
61. See MONBIOT, supra note 1, at 178.
62. See Burris et al., supra note 5.
63. Peter Drahos sees the G-77 as a case of weakness rather than strength in numbers.
The G-77 opted for broad general positions that all its members could live with and as a con-
sequence never developed concrete strategies with bite. Unity was maintained by using the G-
77 as an ideological pulpit for fine speeches on broad matters of principle. The result was
Rothstein's two-track game where developing country orators made grandiose and unrealis-
able demands in their Geneva speeches on behalf of the G-77 and then went back to their
capitals to cut the most pragmatic bilateral deals they could with the US and Europe on behalf
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networking global influence. Internet communication reduces the trans-
action costs of nodal organization of new networks of governance. This
is one reason why NGOs work less today through stable coalitions and
more through issue networks. So as something like the MAI is placed on
the agenda by business-dominated nodes of influence, NGO nodes of
resistance to it swing into action. Nodal governance can make modeling
work as a remarkably important mechanism of globalization. 64 A node of
governance, like a South African peacemaking committee or a social
labeling scheme to confront exploitation of child labor, can spread
through diffusion as more and more actors enact the same strategy in
another place. This is not the place to rehearse the theory and practice of
modeling as a weapon of the weak that has sometimes transformed the
world. The more limited point made here is simply the possibility, as a
hegemonic State shifts a forum from one global institution to another,
that nodes of governance manifesting an alternative model flow around
those institutions and between the cracks of those institutions. Part of the
point of nodes of governance is that instead of resisting institutionally
structured power it can make it irrelevant by flowing around it to estab-
lish alternative sites of governance that people and businesses choose to
support by simply ignoring the formal structure.
In a world where forums are so fluid, shifting them is both more rou-
tine and easier to do. While this might mean that a limited kind of forum
shifting is more practically available to the weak, it will likely remain
the case that moving the dominant bureaucratic forum where final formal
decisions are made is a privilege of the powerful. While nodal govern-
ance works in considerable measure beyond bureaucracy, it also
continues to work to a substantial degree by capturing bureaucracy. The
difficulty is that, while it might be nodes of informal governance that do
most of the real work of regime building and regime transformation, the
final power to redefine the regime usually will rest with a formal struc-
ture. So in the last instance, the actor with the formal clout to desert a
forum and take enough other players with them to render that final deci-
sion impotent, ultimately still has a significantly greater advantage that
no amount of networking can counter. We should not be so starry eyed
about flows of nodal governance to forget that bureaucratic decision-
making remains central to power.
There was no important instance discovered by myself and Drahos
in our fieldwork of developing countries shifting the formal forum that
of their own states. Drahos, supra note 60, at 86-87; see also Robert L. Rothstein, Commodity
Bargaining: The Political Economy of Regime Creation, in POSITIVE SUM: IMPROVING NORTH-
SOUTH NEGOTIATIONS (I. William Zutman ed., 1987).
64. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 2, at 578-601.
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set the parameters of a regime.6- There were no instances of the United
States doing it before World War II either. But it was a post-war strategy
recurrently used by the United States not only with intellectual property,
but with regimes for financial regulation, telecommunications, labor stan-
dards, competition policy, air transport, sea transport, nuclear regulation,
privacy, food standards, and pharmaceuticals. The demonstrated willing-
ness of the U.S. to defect from regimes has engendered a no-United
States-no-deal mentality in the culture of global rulemaking. Yet the
United States itself is often bold enough to start building a regime with
only a few partners. A classic example was its strategy with the money
laundering regime of the Financial Action Task Force, where the U.S.
started the regime by slowly building a "white list" of nations who
would be given preferential treatment by the U.S. financial system. A
decade later, after many nations had qualified for the "white list," the
regime shifted to "black listing" nations based more on negative sanc-
tions for failure to meet the regime's standards.66 Could developing
countries ever be so bold to advance such a strategy-say with social
labeling by NGOs of products from nations that trade fairly with poor
countries?
IV. CONCLUSION
Contrary to realist international relations theory, it is not the direct
threat of economic or military power that is the most powerful weapon
of the United States in the world system. It is more decisively the power
of the United States to shift forums when it does not like what is happen-
ing in a global forum. Effective strategies of resistance are available for
developing countries to better concentrate the power and technical com-
petence they have, to better network it, and to divide and conquer by
enrolling some wealthy nations or corporations to turn their power
against other rich actors. These possibilities have become more profound
as power has changed in the world system from a matter of balancing
Westphalian government power to networked governance. Alliances of
poor nations with NGOs against rich States can be more effective than
alliances with the Soviet block against the First World were during the
Cold War. The networked governance of Manuel Castells' information
age means that weak actors might grasp a node of governance that pulls
strands of networked power together. Or they might tug at a web of
wealth-dominated power to unravel it. George Monbiot has shown how
65. Id. at 564-71.
66. Id. at 105-06.
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poor nations have the weapon of owning the rich nations' banks.67 For
this big stick to be credible, clusters of poor nations must craft a respon-
sive regulatory strategy to render the escalation toward using this big
stick appear inexorable. A priority for poor nations is to make this big
stick credible by demonstrating that they have the political capacity to
escalate toward its use. One of Peter Drahos's important recent insights
is that in a world of networked governance, pyramidal escalation can
mean weak actors, wielding only puny sanctions, can escalate to enroll-
ing more and more actors of increasingly greater clout to a project of
networked confrontation with the strong.
67. MONBIOT, supra note 1.
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